SEC filings and transcripts for GSAMP Trust S3, including financials, news, proxies, indentures, prospectuses, and credit agreements. Commission File Number of issuing entity: GSAMP Trust S3. (Exact name of issuing entity as specified in its Charter). Fraud Audit. Was the risk that Goldman hedged with AIG as bad as Goldman Sachs Alternative Mortgage Products’ GSAMP Trust S3?.
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Interested in legs, thighs, giblets, the heart? In addition, the aforementioned X piece didn’t get fixed monthly payments and thus provided another bit of protection for the 12 tranches ranked above it. Goldman peddled the securities in late April The average equity that the second-mortgage borrowers had in their homes was 0. That prompted Fortune to ask the 2006–s3 to explain to us how it had managed to come out ahead while so many of its mortgage-backed customers were getting stomped.
Loss Severity Approximation for Current Period. You can see why borrowers lined up for the loans, even though they carried high interest rates. Gsa,p, 7 Month Prior. Current Scheduled Payments 1 Month Prior. Securities are simpler to deal with and can be customized. Weighted Average Months to Maturity Prior. Weighted Average Max Rate Current. What is there to take away from our course in Junk Mortgages ?
Customers are happy, because they get only the pieces they want. That prompted Fortune to ask the firm to explain to us how it had managed to come out ahead while so many of its mortgage-backed customers were getting stomped. Finally, Goldman sold two non-investment-grade tranches.
The butcher—excuse us, the investment banker—gives customers what they want.
GSAMP Trust 2006-S3
As long as housing prices kept rising, it all looked copacetic. Pmnts, 6 Month Prior. Pmnts, 9 Month Prior. Weighted Average Max Rate Original. Less than 18 months after the issue was floated, a sixth of the borrowers had already defaulted on their loans.
But in we hit an inflection point. You have only the illusion of safety. Or, as he calls them, “non-prime. Then, if X were wiped out, the losses would work their way up the food chain tranche by tranche: More than hrust third of the loans were in California, then a hot market. You can see why borrowers lined up for the loans, even though they carried high interest rates. Finally, Goldman sold two non-investment-grade tranches.
Someone wants a safe, relatively low-interest, short-term security? As a second-mortgage holder, GSAMP couldn’t foreclose on deadbeats unless the first-mortgage holder also foreclosed.
Weighted Average Cap Down Current. Fortune Magazine — It’s getting hard to wrap your brain around subprime mortgages, Wall Street’s fancy name for junk home loans.
By Allan SloanFortune gsaml editor-at-large. How is a buyer of securities like these supposed to know how safe they are? Default rates are calculated since deal issue date and include realized gains and additional realized losses and gains from prior periods.
Both agencies dropped the top-rated tranches all the way to BBB from their original AAA, depressing the securities’ market price substantially.
One Goldman filing lists more than 1, pages of individual loans – but they’re by code number and zip code, not name and address. As we interpret this—the firm declined to elaborate—Goldman made more on its hedges than it lost on its inventory because junk mortgages fell even more sharply than Goldman thought they would.
GSAMP Trust S3 – Filings and Transcripts – BamSEC
B-2, B-1, M-7, and so on. Welcome to Bailout City! How is a buyer of securities like these supposed to know how safe they are?